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THE EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
UNITED STATES v. JONES, THE INFORMATION CLOUD, AND 
THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
BER-AN PAN∗ 
In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the citizens of the dysto-
pian, totalitarian country of Oceania are subjected to a grim reality of 
constant government surveillance.1  There, “Big Brother” and his 
thought police maintain power through a system of relentless moni-
toring and subjugation using tools such as the omnipresent two-way 
telescreen.2  As an expression of fear and a weighty warning of perva-
sive government scrutiny, society in Nineteen Eighty-Four exists as a lit-
erary satire to which few modern cultures can compare.3  In contrast, 
the technology necessary to fulfill Orwell’s nightmare is far closer to 
fact than fiction. 
Consider the modern smartphone: While its GPS function is an 
indispensable addition to countless road trips, this ubiquitous device 
harbors many of the same capabilities as Nineteen Eighty-Four’s dreaded 
telescreen.  Although an everyday user might think he is being simply 
directed from one location to another, his buying habits, Internet 
searches, and text messages are just a few examples of what a service 
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 1.  GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1988). 
 2.  Id.; see also James Hayes, The Technology of ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’, GEORGE ORWELL 
FESTIVAL, http://georgeorwellfestival.org/?page_id=282 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (ex-
ploring the history and theory behind the telescreens described in Orwell’s novel). 
 3.  The exception to this, if any, is North Korea.  See Doug Bandow, Systematic Tyranny: 
How the Kim Dynasty Holds the North Korean People in Bondage, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2012, 8:58 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/08/29/systematic-tyranny-how-
the-kim-dynasty-holds-the-north-korean-people-in-bondage/ (using a report published by 
the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea to examine the way in which the regime 
maintains its totalitarian society). 
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provider receives in return for that phone’s Internet connection.4  
Similarly, GPS-enabled devices pre-installed in some cars need not 
even be in use to relay detailed travel records that exist as intangible 
entries inside a vast electronic cloud of information.5  Consequently, a 
body of privacy law dependent on physical boundaries is very much in 
danger of becoming as quaint a notion as the public telephone booth. 
In United States v. Jones,6 the Supreme Court of the United States 
concluded that police violated the Fourth Amendment7 of the United 
States Constitution when they attached a GPS-enabled tracking device 
to the defendant’s vehicle and used it to monitor the cars movements 
for twenty-eight days.8  In finding that police violated Jones’s right to 
privacy, Justice Scalia declared that the government’s physical intru-
sion onto Jones’s vehicle was a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
intrinsic tie to property rights.9 
Jones highlights two uniquely prescient concerns: (1) the impact 
of modern information-sharing technology on individual privacy,10 
and (2) what limits ought to be placed on law enforcement from us-
ing such technology unrestricted by physical boundaries.11  This 
Comment will argue that the Court conveniently avoided addressing 
either of these concerns in Jones by applying the property-based ap-
proach developed in outdated cases.12  In doing so, the Court not only 
exploited the loopholes in Fourth Amendment protection created by 
modern technology, but also perpetuated the legal uncertainties that 
                                                        
 4.  See Privacy in the Age of the Smartphone, PRIVACYRIGHTS.ORG (Dec. 2012), 
https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2b-cellprivacy.htm (providing a brief introduction to 
multiple types of information that are traded back and forth between users and service 
providers to educate consumers about privacy concerns when using smartphones and simi-
lar devices). 
 5.   See Chris Woodyard & Jayne O’Donnell, Your Car May be Invading Your Privacy, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/ 
2013/03/24/car-spying-edr-data-privacy/1991751/ (describing the dangers of personal 
information being collected from cars, often without the driver’s knowledge). 
 6.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2011). 
 7.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
 9.  Id. at 949. 
 10.  See infra Part II.A.1.a. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C. 
 12.  See infra Part I.C. 
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frustrate individual citizens and law enforcement agents.13  Instead, 
the Court should have recognized that the capabilities of modern 
technology go beyond physical limitations and adapted the Fourth 
Amendment to address this new intangible reality.14 
Part I will conduct a particularized analysis of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing specifically on the evolution of a 
strictly property-based approach into the more nebulous “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” that has split state and federal courts.  Part II 
will advance three arguments: first, it will argue that the nature of 
modern technology has fundamentally changed the way society oper-
ates; second, it will suggest that legislative bodies may be more suited 
to address this concern on a broader level; finally, it will contend that 
framing the Fourth Amendment as a “right to exclude” better ad-
dresses the concerns raised by modern technology.  Part III will con-
clude that while Jones was not decided wrongly, courts must advance 
an updated perspective of this constitutional guarantee before the 
guarantee declines into irrelevancy. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part begins with a brief introduction to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, with particular attention 
paid to the relationship between individual privacy and property 
rights.15  Next, it surveys how state and federal courts have applied the 
Court’s decisions in factually similar cases and reached inconsistent 
results.16  Finally, it discusses the reasoning behind the Court’s deci-
sion in Jones.17  Due consideration is given to the majority opinion 
written by Justice Scalia as well as the concurring opinions of Justices 
Alito and Sotomayor. 
A.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence Reflects a Keen Sensitivity to Privacy 
Concerns Not Limited to Physical Intrusions 
The full text of the Fourth Amendment states that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
                                                        
 13.  See infra Part II.A. 
 14.  See infra Part II.C. 
 15.  See infra Part I.A. 
 16.  See infra Part I.B. 
 17.  See infra Part I.C. 
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but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.18 
At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, neither the 
government nor its agents had access to the type of GPS-enabled de-
vices that are the focus of Jones.19  Instead, the Fourth Amendment was 
written when visual surveillance and physical invasions were the pri-
mary method of gathering private information from individuals.20  
Early Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects this reality as it restricted 
the application of the Fourth Amendment to cases of physical tres-
pass.21  The later development of a “reasonable expectation of priva-
cy” not explicitly tied to property rights represents the judiciary’s at-
tempt to update the Fourth Amendment to meet modern concerns.22 
1.  The Supreme Court Initially Limited the Protection of the Fourth 
Amendment to Physical Trespass Despite Strong Dissent 
In Olmstead v. United States,23 the Court held that inserting wires 
into ordinary telephone wires without a trespass of the defendants’ 
real property did not constitute a search or seizure.24  Even if the 
Fourth Amendment ought to be “liberally construed,”25 the Court de-
clared, no literal search or seizure occurred in this case because the 
evidence was “secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that on-
ly.”26  As a result, the majority effectively tied the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to cases of physical trespass, suggesting that in 
                                                        
 18.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2011). 
 20.  See id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood 
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”). 
 21.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
 22.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 23.  277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 24.  Id. at 465.  The Court also compared telephone wires to public highways to justify 
its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment “ cannot be extended and expanded to include 
telephone wires reaching to the whole world . . . .  The intervening wires are not part of his 
house or office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”  Id. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 464. 
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the absence of trespass, no privacy rights are implicated.27  Yet even at 
this early stage, Justice Brandeis argued the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted in a simpler time and that “[t]ime works changes, [and] 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes.”28  Moreover, he 
emphasized that “[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Gov-
ernment with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-
tapping.”29  Justice Butler dissented on the grounds that the Court 
should not limit itself to the “literal or ordinary meanings of the 
words [of the Fourth Amendment],” but rather “in the light of the 
principles upon which it was founded.”30 
In spite of these objections, the Court adopted a similar stance in 
Goldman v. United States31 more than a decade later, finding that no 
search or seizure occurred when law enforcement used a detecta-
phone32 to listen in on conversations through the wall of an adjoining 
office.33  Insofar as the petitioners had to reckon with Olmstead, the 
Court was not only unwilling to overrule its previous decision but also 
rejected the suggested distinction between (a) one who assumes the 
risk his communication over telephone wires might be intercepted 
and (b) one who does not intend his conversation to pass through 
walls.34  While Justices Stone and Frankfurter dissented on the same 
grounds as they did in Olmstead,35 Justice Murphy wrote separately and 
argued: “[I]t has not been the rule or practice of this Court to permit 
the scope and operation of broad principles ordained by the Consti-
tution to be restricted, by a literal reading of its provisions, to those 
                                                        
 27.  Id. (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things . . . it 
must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.”). 
 28.  Id. at 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 29.  Id. at 474. 
 30.  Id. at 487. 
 31.  316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1967). 
 32.  A detectaphone was described by the Court as a “device . . . having a receiver so 
delicate as, when placed against the partition wall, to pick up sound waves originating in 
[the] office, and means for amplifying and hearing them.”  Id. at 131. 
 33.  Id. at 135. 
 34.  Id.  The Court deemed this distinction “too nice for practical application of the 
Constitutional guarantee.”  Id.  The Court additionally reasoned that the term “intercept” 
did not “ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it 
leaves the possession of the proposed sender.”  Id. at 134. 
 35.  Id. at 136 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
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evils and phenomena that were contemporary with its framing.”36  In-
stead, Justice Murphy recognized “[t]he conditions of modern life 
have greatly expanded the range and character of those activities 
which require protection from intrusive action by Government offi-
cials”37 such that “[p]hysical entry may be wholly immaterial.”38  Em-
phasizing the need for a warrant to adequately safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights, Justice Murphy concluded that Olmstead’s holding 
was “wrong.”39 
Nonetheless, the Court maintained its reluctance to separate the 
Fourth Amendment from physical property rights two decades later, 
rejecting an offer to reconsider Olmstead and Goldman in Silverman v. 
United States.40  There, the petitioners argued that police officers’ at-
tachment of a spike mike41 to the heating duct of their house effec-
tively transformed it into a gigantic microphone that ran through the 
entire building.42  Despite the petitioners supplementing their case 
with additional examples “in the light of recent and projected devel-
opments in the science of electronics” and the Court’s open admis-
sion that “the vaunted marvels of an electronic age” may yet contem-
plate Fourth Amendment implications, the majority concentrated on 
the fact that “the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an 
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises.”43  In doing so, 
the majority distinguished the eavesdropping in Goldman as not in-
volving any “unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitu-
                                                        
 36.  Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 139. 
 39.  Id. at 141. 
 40.  365 U.S. 505 (1961), superseded by statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Street Safety Act (“Wiretap Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006). 
 41.  At the onset of his opinion, Justice Stewart described the design and the operation 
of a spike mike thusly:  
The instrument in question was a microphone with a spike about a foot long at-
tached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones.  The of-
ficers inserted the spike under a baseboard in a second-floor room of the vacant 
house and into a crevice extending several inches into the party wall, until the 
spike hit something solid “that acted as a very good sounding board.” 
Id. at 506. 
 42.  Id. at 506–07. 
 43.  Id. at 508–09. 
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tionally protected area.”44  Despite open concern over the capabilities 
of new technology, the Court thus repeatedly required physical tres-
pass before triggering Fourth Amendment protection. 
2.  The Supreme Court Specifically Rejected Olmstead and Goldman 
in Favor of a Reasonable Standard of Privacy Unrestricted by a 
Requisite Physical Intrusion 
The Court changed course in Katz v. United States,45 and Justice 
Stewart’s majority opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence altered 
significantly the application of the Fourth Amendment.46  Katz was 
convicted of violating a statute prohibiting the interstate transmission 
by wire communication of bets or wagers.47  As a part of their investi-
gation, police officers installed an electronic device into the public 
telephone booth used by Katz to listen and to record the words spo-
ken into the receiver.48  Reversing the judgment of the appellate 
court, the Supreme Court held that the government’s activities violat-
ed “the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure.’”49  
Though it characterized the government’s contention that a tele-
phone booth was not a “constitutionally protected area” as “mislead-
ing,” the majority refused to translate the Fourth Amendment into a 
“general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”50  Rather, the Court recog-
nized the Fourth Amendment’s protection extended beyond specific 
types of governmental intrusion and may “often have nothing to do 
with privacy at all.”51 
                                                        
 44.  Id. at 510.  The Court also stated that “[i]nherent Fourth Amendment rights are 
not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.”  Id. at 
511.  Rather, it defined the Fourth Amendment as one that secures “personal rights” at 
which “the very core stands the right of a man retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”  Id. 
 45.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 46.  Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 47.  Id. at 348 (majority opinion). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 353.  The appellate court had determined that no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion occurred because there was no “‘physical entrance into the area occupied.’”  Id. at 
348–49. 
 50.  Id. at 350–51. 
 51.  Id. at 350.  Notably, the majority recognized that the agents involved in Katz acted 
with restraint in installing the listening device but held that “the inescapable fact is that 
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”  Id. at 356.  
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Justice Stewart specifically emphasized that protecting places or 
what a person might knowingly expose to the public was not the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment.52  He argued that the Fourth 
Amendment assures “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.”53  Indicating that the Court had expanded the application of 
the Fourth Amendment well beyond the narrow ambit of trespass to 
govern “not only the seizure of tangible items, but . . . [also] the re-
cording of oral statements, overheard without any ‘technical trespass 
under . . . local property law,’”54 Justice Stewart also concluded that 
“the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by 
our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling.”55  Famously, Justice Stewart 
declared that “[t]he fact that the electronic device employed to 
achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth 
can have no constitutional significance” for “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”56 
                                                        
Therefore, in the absence of a warrant, “searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.”  Id. at 357. 
 52.  Id. at 351. 
 53.  Id. at 351–52.  The government alternatively argued that because the telephone 
was transparent, Katz could not reasonably rely upon the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 352.  In response, the Court not only pointed out that what Katz 
sought to exclude was the “uninvited ear” rather than the “intruding eye,” but also advo-
cated for a broader interpretation of the Constitution concerning “vital” tools like the tel-
ephone booth.  Id.  Specifically, “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the 
vital role that the public telephone has come to come play in private communication.”  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 55.  Id. at 353. 
 56.  Id.  Using Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969), to define a person as 
one “aggrieved by the invasion,” the Court also held that “there is a substantial difference 
for constitutional purposes between preventing the incrimination of a defendant and 
through the very evidence illegally seized from him and suppressing evidence on the mo-
tion of a party who cannot claim this predicate for exclusion.”  Id. at 174.  An owner of the 
premises, however, “would be entitled to the suppression of government evidence originat-
ing in electronic surveillance violative of his own Fourth Amendment right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . whether or not he was present or participated in 
those conversations.”  Id. at 176.  Likewise in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the 
Court declined to extend standing in Fourth Amendment cases to criminal defendants 
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Despite Justice Stewart’s well-reasoned opinion, Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence is cited most often for its summary of principles defining 
a “[c]onstitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”57  
To Justice Harlan, Fourth Amendment protection carried two pre-
requisites: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”58  Thus, according to 
Justice Harlan, the government violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment 
rights because: (1) he subjectively expected his conversations inside 
the telephone would remain private, and (2) society accepts such ex-
pectations as objectively reasonable because telephone booths are 
“temporarily private place[s] whose momentary occupants’ expecta-
tions of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”59  Jus-
tice Harlan continued to describe Goldman’s limitations on Fourth 
Amendment protections as “bad physics as well as bad law, for reason-
able expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as 
physical invasion.”60 
Justice Black dissented, objecting to the majority’s Fourth 
Amendment interpretation and to the suggestion that the Court 
ought to assume the role of updating the Amendment to current sen-
                                                        
who could neither assert a possessory nor a property interest in the place searched by po-
lice officers.  Id. at 133.  The Court also considered the proposition that “a person can 
have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth 
Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place” to 
be “unremarkable.”  Id. at 142. 
 57.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 58.  Id. at 361. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 362.  Justice Harlan also declared that “[a]s elsewhere under the Fourth 
Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforce-
ment may demand specific exceptions.”  Id.  Interestingly, Justice White’s concurrence 
pointed out that “today’s decision does not reach national security cases.”  Id. at 363 
(White, J., concurring).  Even further, he argued that a broad exception to the warrant 
process should be granted to “the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, 
the Attorney General,” provided that a magistrate or a judge “has considered the require-
ments of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.”  Id. at 
364.  This open issue would return in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 
(1972), in which the majority held that prior judicial approval was required for the types of 
domestic security surveillance contemplated under the Wiretap Act.  Id. at 323–24.  In that 
case, Justice White concurred on the statutory ground alone and did not reach the consti-
tutional issue discussed by the majority.  Id. at 336 (White, J., concurring). 
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sibilities.61  Regarding the former objection, Justice Black took a strict 
approach in construing the language of the Fourth Amendment and 
concluded that the text did not apply to what he characterized as 
“eavesdropping” because “the language of the second clause indicates 
that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can 
be seized but to something already in existence so it can be de-
scribed.”62  Despite accepting the premise that “[t]apping telephone 
wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted,” Justice Black argued that the Framers 
were aware of eavesdropping as an “ancient practice which at com-
mon law was condemned as a nuisance”63 and would have restricted 
law enforcement’s use of eavesdropping had they desired to do so.64  
In explaining his second objection, Justice Black advocated against 
“distort[ing] the words of the Amendment to ‘keep the Constitution 
up to date’ or ‘to bring it into harmony with the times.’”65  Such pow-
er, he suggested, would inappropriately transform the Court into a 
“continuously functioning constitutional convention.”66 
B.  The Decisions Following Katz Demonstrate a Struggle to Consistently 
Apply the Fourth Amendment to Modern Situations 
Without overturning the analysis applied in Katz, Smith v. Mary-
land67 sparked a series of challenges to its modern applicability, which 
culminated in Jones.  These challenges highlighted the divide between 
the now quaint “spike mike” and “detectaphone” operations68 and 
their modern replacements: inexpensive GPS-enabled tracking devic-
es as small as an iPod, many of which already pre-installed in everyday 
                                                        
 61.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 62.  Id. at 365. 
 63.  Id. at 366 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64.  Id.  Justice Black went as far as to express a professional disappointment in his 
peers, declaring: “[I]t strikes me as a charge against their scholarship, their common sense 
and their candor to give to the Fourth Amendment’s language the eavesdropping mean-
ing the Courts imputes to it today.”  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 373. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 68.  See supra Part I.A.1. 
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phones and vehicles.69  While the Court has been relatively conserva-
tive in applying Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test in context-specific circumstances, state and federal courts have 
been divided.70 
1.  The Court Has Struggled to Balance Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy with Modern Information-Gathering Technology 
In Smith, the Court held that obtaining information derived from 
a pen register was not a Fourth Amendment search.71  Using the two-
step test described by Justice Harlan in Katz, the majority rejected the 
defendant’s claims that he had a legitimate, subjective expectation of 
privacy regarding the telephone numbers dialed from his home be-
cause telephone companies routinely made permanent records of all 
numbers dialed and Smith voluntarily conveyed this information to 
his particular provider.72  Moreover, the Court declared that “the site 
of the call is immaterial”73 because Smith’s expectation that his con-
duct would remain private was not one “‘that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.’”74 
Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that, although a list of 
numbers dialed may not be incriminating in itself, “it easily could re-
veal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus re-
veal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”75  Justice Marshall’s 
dissent added that “the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive re-
sponsibility.”76  According to Justice Marshall, law enforcement offi-
                                                        
 69.  See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 
1310 (2012) (“Millions now own sophisticated tracking devices (smartphones) studded 
with sensors and always connected to the Internet.”). 
 70.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 71.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.  The pen register recorded numbers dialed from the 
defendant’s home.  Id. at 737.  The police were investigating the defendant for a robbery 
after which the victim reported receiving “threatening and obscene” phone calls from a 
man who claimed to be the robber.  Id.   
 72.  Id. at 742. 
 73.  Id. at 743. 
 74.  Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring)). 
 75.  Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 76.  Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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cials should almost always be required to obtain a warrant before re-
questing information from telephone companies.77 
Only a few years later in United States v. Knotts,78 the Court held 
that the government’s warrantless monitoring of a GPS-enabled beep-
er surreptitiously placed in a can of chemicals sold to the defendant 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.79  The government argued 
that the beeper was merely a supplement to officers’ visual surveil-
lance of the defendant, which included following his truck from the 
initial purchase of the can to his cabin.80  Recognizing that officers 
combined both methods of surveillance, the Court added that “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”81  Famously, the reasoning given was that “[n]othing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sen-
sory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as 
science and technology afforded them in this case.”82 
In contrast, the Court in United States v. Karo83 found that the 
monitoring of a beeper installed into a can of ether sold to the de-
fendant implicated the protection of the Fourth Amendment because 
it “reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the 
Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not 
have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”84  In spite of the govern-
                                                        
 77.  Id. at 752.  Justice Brennan joined both dissents.  Id. at 746, 748. 
 78.  460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 79.  Id. at 285. 
 80.  Id. at 282. 
 81.  Id. at 281.  The Court also noted that “[w]e have commented more than once on 
the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile.”  Id.  Thus, because the defend-
ant traveled on public and private roads, the Court declared that “no such expectation of 
privacy extended to the visual observation of [the defendant]’s automobile arriving on his 
premises after leaving a public highway.”  Id. at 282.  Further, the defendant had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, including “whatever stops he made.”  Id.  Surprisingly, Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall concurred, noting that, had the defendant challenged “not 
merely certain aspects of the monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform con-
tainer . . . but also its original installation,” their opinions might have been the opposite.  
Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 82.  Id. at 282 (majority opinion). 
 83.  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 84.  Id. at 715.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred 
only insofar as the “agents thereafter learned who had the container and where it was only 
through use of the beeper.”  Id. at 733 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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ment’s objections that a broad warrant requirement would raise the 
difficulty of conducting any search, the Court offered no sympathy in 
concluding that it was entirely possible to describe the circumstances 
and length of time in which a beeper might be installed into a partic-
ular object.85  Furthermore, the Court stated that the primary reason 
behind the warrant procedure was to “interpose a ‘neutral and de-
tached magistrate’ between the citizen and ‘the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”86 
2.  The Rapid Integration of New Information-Sharing Technology 
into Everyday Activity Has Enabled Contrasting Interpretations of 
Context-Sensitive Precedent 
The Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of the Fourth 
Amendment is reflected in a split among the lower courts.  On the 
one hand, some federal courts have declared that no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy exists when an individual travels on public streets 
and thus no warrant is required to monitor those movements.87  On 
the other hand, some state courts have stressed that the superior ca-
pabilities of modern surveillance technology implicates the Fourth 
                                                        
 85.  Id. at 718 (majority opinion).  Karo also offered the Court an opportunity to ad-
dress the concerns voiced by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Knotts, namely, whether the 
installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the original owner’s consent con-
stituted a search or seizure when the container is delivered to the buyer without 
knowledge of said beeper.  Id. at 711.  To resolve the legality of the warrantless installation, 
the Court quickly declared that “[i]t is clear that the actual placement of the beeper into 
the can violated no one’s Fourth Amendment rights. . . . [B]y no stretch of the imagina-
tion could it be said that respondents then had any legitimate expectation of privacy in it.”  
Id.  The majority went on to note that the transfer of the can containing the beeper “in-
fringed no privacy interest,” for it “conveyed no information at all.”  Id. at 712.  Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence opinion went even further and would have construed the privacy 
interests implicated by the activation of the beeper as “unusually narrow,” because “one 
who lacks ownership of the container itself or the power to move the container at will, can 
have no reasonable expectation that the movements of the container will not be tracked.”  
Id. at 722 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Instead, Justice O’Connor would “use as the touch-
stone the defendant’s interest in which the beeper is placed.”  Id. at 724.  Yet even in spite 
of traditional Fourth Amendment protection of the home, “[a] privacy interest in a home 
itself need not be coextensive with a privacy interest in the contents or movements of eve-
rything situated inside the home.”  Id. at 725. 
 86.  Id. at 717 (majority opinion) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
(1948)). 
 87.  See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
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Amendment.88  The result of this inconsistency is an incomplete and, 
at times, contradictory Fourth Amendment doctrine.89 
a. Prior to Jones, Circuits Recognized That No Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy Exists Along Public Streets and No 
Warrant Is Required to Monitor Movements Thereupon 
In United States v. Garcia,90 the defendant was convicted of crimes 
relating to the manufacture of methamphetamines.91  The district 
court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a GPS-
enabled tracking device the police had attached to the defendant’s 
car without a warrant.92  Writing for the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner held that no search or sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment occurred and thus no warrant was 
required.93  Judge Posner emphasized the similarities between older 
surveillance technology with the device officers used, concluding that: 
“GPS tracking is on the same side of the divide with the surveillance 
cameras and the satellite imaging, and if what they do is not searching 
in Fourth Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking.”94  Despite ac-
knowledging Katz’s insistence that the Fourth Amendment ought to 
“keep pace with the march of science”95 and that “[t]echnological 
progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveil-
lance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive,”96 
Judge Posner nonetheless concluded “the amendment cannot sensi-
bly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the twen-
ty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”97  If anything, Judge 
                                                        
 88.  See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 89.  See infra Part II.A. 
 90.  474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 91.  Id. at 995. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 996–97 (“But of course the presumption in favor of requiring a warrant, or 
for that matter the overarching requirement of reasonableness, does not come into play 
unless there is a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).  Judge 
Posner did recognize, however, that United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), left open 
“the question whether installing [the beeper] in the vehicle converted the subsequent 
tracking into a search.”  Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996–97. 
 94.  Id. at 997. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 998. 
 97.  Id. 
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Posner acknowledged that the balance between individual security 
and effective security often falls in favor of the former.98 
In United States v. Marquez,99 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit took a similar approach in holding that the in-
stallation and use of a GPS-enabled tracking device to monitor the de-
fendant’s vehicle did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.100  
Agreeing with Knotts, the Third Circuit explained that there is no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy when a person travels in an automobile 
via public streets.101  Moreover, the court concluded that so long as 
police have reasonable suspicion that a particular vehicle is being 
used in pursuit of a crime such as the transport of drugs, “a warrant is 
not required when . . . they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device 
on it for a reasonable period of time.”102  Thus, because here there 
was “nothing random or arbitrary about the installation and use of 
the device,” and the installation itself was “non-invasive and occurred 
when the vehicle was parked in public,” Judge Wollman held that no 
search occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.103 
                                                        
 98.  Id. 
 99.  605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 100.  Id. at 607.  The court also found that the defendant lacked standing to contest the 
search of a place to which he had “an insufficiently close connection” because he neither 
“owned nor drove the Ford and was only an occasional passenger therein.”  Id. at 609. 
 101.  Id.  The court did acknowledge, however, that “[w]hen . . . police use electronic 
monitoring in a private residence, not open to visual surveillance, it violates reasonable 
expectations of privacy and is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 609–
10. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  The court specifically acknowledged Judge Posner’s opinion in Garcia, warning 
that although the ability to monitor and to install GPS devices was increasing, the device 
here “merely allowed the police to reduce the cost of lawful surveillance.”  Id.; see Garcia, 
474 F.3d at 998 (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of 
surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.”); see also United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the undercarriage of his vehicle when 
parked on a street or parking lot, and thus the government’s installation and use of a mo-
bile tracking device did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search), vacated, Pineda-
Moreno v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). 
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b. State Courts Have Emphasized the Capacity of Modern 
Technology to Go Beyond the Physical Senses and Collect an 
Unreasonable Amount of Information 
Compare the stance taken by federal appellate courts with the 
opposite approach adopted by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington and the Supreme Court of the State of New York.  The 
Washington supreme court, in State v. Jackson,104 concluded that the 
installation of GPS-enabled devices onto the defendant’s vehicles con-
stituted a search or a seizure requiring a warrant.105  Although the 
court found that probable cause existed and that law enforcement 
agents properly obtained a warrant for the GPS tracking,106 it explicitly 
refrained from concluding in all cases that the “use of the GPS devices 
to monitor [the defendant]’s travels merely equates to following him 
on public roads where he has voluntarily exposed himself to public 
view.”107 
Likewise, in People v. Weaver,108 the New York supreme court held 
that the placement of a GPS-enabled device onto the defendant’s ve-
hicle and the subsequent monitoring of his movement constituted a 
search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.109  Accept-
ing that individuals have a significantly reduced expectation of privacy 
along public roads,110 the court declared that the GPS-enabled device 
used was not a mere enhancement of an officer’s senses, but rather “a 
surrogate technological deployment” capable of “[c]onstant, relent-
less tracking.”111  Reasoning that these devices “facilitate[] a new tech-
nological perception of the world,”112 the court concluded that with-
out judicial oversight, prolonged use of GPS-enabled tracking devices 
                                                        
 104.  76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003). 
 105.  Id. at 224. 
 106.  Id. at 231. 
 107.  Id. at 223. 
 108.  909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
 109.  Id. at 1203. 
 110.  Id. at 1198.  The court did concede that “[i]t is, of course, true that the expecta-
tion of privacy has been deemed diminished in a car upon a public thoroughfare.”  Id. at 
1200. 
 111.  Id. at 1199; see also Renee Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search, 38 SEARCH & SEIZURE 
L. REP. 21, 26 (2011) (suggesting a new test that differentiates between “sense-
augmenting” or “extrasensory” devices). 
 112.  Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d at 1199. 
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constituted a massive invasion of privacy “inconsistent with even the 
slightest reasonable expectation of privacy.”113 
C.  In Jones, the Supreme Court Relied on Property Rights to Apply 
Fourth Amendment Protection and Left Unresolved Its Relevance to 
Modern Technology 
In 2004, the FBI and the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Po-
lice Department launched a joint operation to investigate Antoine 
Jones and his associates for allegedly supplying significant amounts of 
cocaine and cocaine base to residents of the District, the State of Mar-
yland, and elsewhere.114  In addition to direct visual surveillance and 
the use of cellphone wiretaps, agents obtained a warrant in 2005 au-
thorizing the installation of a GPS-enabled tracking device onto the 
Jeep Grand Cherokee Jones used subject to two requirements: (1) 
that the device be installed within ten days and (2) inside the bound-
aries of the District of Columbia.115  Agents installed the device onto 
the undercarriage of Jones’s Jeep in Maryland on the eleventh day 
and then proceeded to use the device to track the whole of Jones’s 
movements over the next twenty-eight days.116  The task force ceased 
covert operations in October when agents seized drugs, firearms, and 
cash from a stash house and the homes of a number of Jones’s co-
conspirators.117  Jones and eight other defendants were charged with 
multiple narcotics-related violations the following day.118 
                                                        
 113.  Id. at 1201–03.  The dissenting opinion written by Judge Smith argued that “[t]he 
proposition that some devices are too modern and sophisticated to be used freely in police 
investigation is not a defensible rule of constitutional law.”  Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissent-
ing).  The other dissenting opinion authored by Judge Read opined that “[t]he GPS moni-
toring technology used in this case was less intrusive or informative than physical surveil-
lance of the defendant would have been.”  Id. at 1210 (Read, J., dissenting). 
 114.  United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73–74 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011). 
 115.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 116.  Id.  Law enforcement agents stepped in once during this period to replace the de-
vice’s battery while the vehicle was parked at a public parking lot in Maryland.  Id. 
 117.  Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 74. 
 118.  Id. at 73.  Specifically, Jones and his associates were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846 
with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or 
more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base.  Id.  They were also charged with 
individual violations, including use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug traffick-
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Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion contending that the agents 
originally lacked probable cause to attach the GPS-enabled device to 
his vehicle and that the installation occurred outside the bounds of 
the original warrant.119  Although the government conceded that it 
committed technical violations of the warrant,120 the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia agreed that the placement 
of the GPS device remained proper because Jones lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when traveling in public and admitted the in-
formation gathered from the device while the Jeep was on public 
roads.121  The jury ultimately failed to reach a verdict on the conspiracy 
count and acquitted Jones and his co-defendants on all others.122  But, 
the government filed another indictment in March 2007 in which the 
jury found Jones and a co-conspirator guilty, and both were sentenced 
to life imprisonment in a joint trial that concluded in January 2008.123 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit distinguished the facts from Knotts on the basis of 
the level of detail with which the GPS-enabled device recorded Jones’s 
extended habits.124  Concluding that the transmission of information 
gathered over such a prolonged period was neither harmless nor rea-
sonable,125 the court reversed Jones’s conviction because the evidence 
admitted against him “reveal[ed] types of information not revealed by 
short-term surveillance”126 and thus violated his Fourth Amendment 
                                                        
ing offense.  Id.  Jones was additionally charged with two counts of unlawful possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine or cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count Two), and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count Three), 
respectively.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 87–88. 
 120.  Id. at 88.  The court suppressed all evidence gathered from the GPS-enabled track-
ing device while the vehicle was parked in Jones’s personal garage.  Id. at 89. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 558. 
 125.  Id. at 567–68. 
 126.  Id. at 562.  On the same grounds, the court also rejected the government’s asser-
tion that Jones actually exposed his movements to the public and thus constructively re-
vealed the whole of his movements, analogizing the facts to cases where the Government 
has sought to use exactly the same theory in reverse.  See id. at 562 (“As with the ‘mosaic 
theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information, 
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rights.127  The D.C. Circuit denied the government’s petition for re-
hearing en banc.128 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the government’s in-
stallation and tracking of a GPS-enabled device on Jones’s vehicle out-
side the bounds of a judicially-authorized warrant constituted an un-
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.129  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that the phrase “in their persons, 
house, papers, and effects,”130 reflected the Amendment’s historically 
“close connection to property.”131  Despite conceding that the Court 
had deviated from this approach with the introduction of a “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy,”132 Justice Scalia emphasized that the Katz 
test constituted an addition, not a substitution, to the common-law 
trespassory rule.133  Contending that the Fourth Amendment at a min-
imum must protect those rights afforded to individuals, Justice Scalia 
concluded that “‘when the Government does engage in physical in-
trusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain infor-
mation, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment’”134 because “such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when it was adopted.”135 
                                                        
‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a 
broad view of the scene.’”); see also infra Part II.A.1.b. 
 127.  Id. at 568. 
 128.  United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.D.C. 2006).  Four judges dissented to 
the Government’s petition.  Id. 
 129.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2011). 
 130.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 131.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 132.  Id. at 950. 
 133.  Id. at 952. 
 134.  Id. at 951 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 
(1986)). 
 135.  Id. at 949.  The Court also stressed that its post-Katz rejection of Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to electronic monitoring using beeper devices such as those featured in 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 148 U.S. 705 (1984), 
did not foreclose its conclusion here.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52.  Justice Scalia pointed out 
that the GPS-enabled device used to track Jones was trespassorily installed while the Jeep 
was in his possession, unlike the circumstances in Knotts and Karo where agents attached 
similar devices to items not yet in the defendants’ possession.  Id.  Furthermore, in re-
sponse to the government’s argument that the mere visual examination of a car in the 
public eye could not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court high-
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Justice Alito concurred with the majority’s judgment not because 
he agreed that the physical attachment of the GPS-enabled device 
constituted a search or seizure, but instead because “the lengthy mon-
itoring” violated the reasonable expectation to privacy afforded to 
Jones under Katz.136  Criticizing the Court’s focus as “unwise” and 
“highly artificial,” Justice Alito reasoned that the degree of privacy 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was first adopted was an 
inappropriate analogy reminiscent of the trespass rule previously 
abandoned in Katz.137  Instead, Justice Alito argued that prolonged 
surveillance conducted purely through indirect, electronic means 
would lead to “particularly vexing problems.”138  Applying Katz’s “ex-
                                                        
lighted the admission of the Government agents involved that “‘the officers in this case did 
more than conduct a visual inspection of respondent’s vehicle.’”  Id. at 952 (emphasis 
omitted).  Similarly, the government’s contention that an electronic information-
gathering intrusion in a literal open field did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search 
failed to persuade the Court because open fields are not afforded the same level of protec-
tion afforded to a private home.  Id. at 953.  Justice Scalia also added that the Court had 
no occasion to consider whether the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
to attach the GPS device in the absence of a valid warrant because the government did not 
raise the issue in the lower courts.  Id. at 954. 
 136.  Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito argued that “‘an actual trespass is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’”  Id. at 960 (empha-
sis omitted) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)).  Justice Alito also 
described the GPS-enabled device used in Jones to be “trivial,” and that restricting Fourth 
Amendment protection to instances in which such an item is physically attached to anoth-
er’s property created the danger of “incongruous results.”  Id. at 961; see also United States 
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (2010) (finding that the defendant lacked standing to make 
a Fourth Amendment challenge to the installation and use of a GPS-enabled device to the 
bumper of a vehicle in which he was merely an occasional passenger).  Justice Alito ex-
pressed additional concern that the majority’s trespass-based rule would completely ignore 
prolonged monitoring using closed-circuit television video monitoring, automatic toll col-
lection systems, cellphones, and other “social” phone-location-tracking services.  Jones, 132 
S. Ct. at 963. 
 137.  Id. at 958. 
 138.  Id. at 962.  Specifically, Justice Alito criticized Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the pro-
tection of property originally afforded by the Fourth Amendment to be a misguided appli-
cation of “18th-century tort law.”  Id. at 957.  Justice Alito noted, for example: “[S]uppose 
that the officers in the present case had followed respondent by surreptitiously activating a 
stolen vehicle detection system that came with the car when it was purchased.  Would the 
sending of a radio signal to activate this system constitute a trespass to chattels?”  Id. at 962. 
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pectation-of-privacy test” would not only avoid these problems,139 he 
explained, but would more appropriately reflect the practical reality 
of modern surveillance technology that regularly utilizes small, easy-
to-use, and relatively cheap devices to monitor persons.140  Conse-
quently, Justice Alito concluded that the appropriate approach to a 
Fourth Amendment inquiry was to ask “whether the use of GPS track-
ing in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasona-
ble person would not have anticipated.”141 
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice 
Scalia insofar as “Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test aug-
mented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespasso-
ry test that preceded it.”142  Consequently, “the trespassory test applied 
in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional mini-
mum . . . .  The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this 
case.”143  Nonetheless, Justice Sotomayor also echoed Justice Alito’s 
warning that technological advances may render physical trespass ir-
relevant because “GPS monitoring . . . may ‘alter the relationship be-
tween citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic 
society.’”144  Specifically, an individual’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy may not be appropriate for a society where “people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.”145  Moreover, Justice Sotomayor raised 
doubts regarding the fundamental trigger of the Fourth Amendment, 
adding that such people “can attain constitutionally protected status 
                                                        
 139.  Id. at 962.  Justice Alito conceded that his recommendation would present its own 
issues.  Id.  On the one hand, “judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy 
with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”  Id.  On the 
other hand, “the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person 
has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.”  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 964.  Justice Alito did acknowledge, however, that the privacy consequences 
of “dramatic technological change” might be better resolved through legislatures more 
suited to “balanc[ing] privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (holding that the placement of a GPS tracking unit on the 
defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment), vacated, Cuevas-Perez v. Unit-
ed States, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012)). 
 145.  Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy 
as a prerequisite for privacy.”146 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Although the majority in Jones ultimately found that the govern-
ment’s installation and use of a GPS-enabled tracking device consti-
tuted a search under the Fourth Amendment, it did so on the basis of 
its “close connection to property.”147  In contrast, Justice Alito’s con-
currence reckoned with the numerous uncertainties in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence raised by modern technology unburdened 
by physical limitations by advancing a standard based upon a “reason-
able expectation of privacy.”148  Yet neither Justice Scalia’s nor Justice 
Alito’s opinions properly recognize how the capabilities of modern 
technology have fundamentally changed how people share infor-
mation.149  In fact, legislative bodies acting in concert with the aca-
demic and business worlds may be better equipped to solve this 
quagmire than a piecemeal solution gradually created by the judici-
ary.  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (“Wiretap Act”)150 and the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (“ECPA”)151 provide two examples in which a similar collaboration 
has implemented useful, if imperfect, protections of individual priva-
cy rights.152 
                                                        
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 949 (majority opinion). 
 148.  Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test.  Situations involving 
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz 
analysis” (emphasis omitted)).  It also seems as if Justices Scalia, Alito, and Sotomayor be-
lieve that the Fourth Amendment is due a re-evaluation.  While Justice Alito supported the 
already established test set by Katz, Justices Scalia and Sotomayor seemed to regard Jones as 
simply the inappropriate arena in which to re-examine what privacy rights the Constitution 
guarantees.  Justice Sotomayor even suggested as much, agreeing with Justice Alito’s con-
cern that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance,” but also 
siding with Justice Scalia insofar as “the trespassory test applied in the majority’s opin-
ion . . . suffices to decide this case.”  Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 149.  See supra Part I.C. 
 150.  Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2006)). 
 151.  Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2006)). 
 152.  See infra Part II.B. 
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Until such a broad collaborative solution can be reached, courts 
must first act on their own to uniformly recognize that electronic 
tracking and other electronic information-gathering processes consti-
tute searches under the Fourth Amendment.153  Moreover, courts 
ought to take the additional step of recognizing the Fourth Amend-
ment as guaranteeing a person’s “right to exclude” the government to 
better address uniquely modern concerns.154  In an era where tangible 
property is becoming increasingly irrelevant,155 understanding this 
constitutional right as a positive one restores it to its original guaran-
tee: “the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects.”156  Jones should thus be read as an example of outdated Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that, in the absence of legislative revision, 
ought to spur courts to adopt an appropriately modern picture of its 
constitutional guarantee.157 
A.  Current Supreme Court Jurisprudence Is Inappropriate and Ill-Suited 
to Electronic Tracking 
Despite offering several different interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment,158 the Supreme Court has yet to address how it might be 
violated through intrinsically intangible, electronic means.  Addition-
ally, just as the individual citizen deserves some measure of privacy in 
the face of technology that has significantly altered the way in which 
they communicate with one another,159 so too must law enforcement 
agencies have access to superior technological tools and bright-line 
                                                        
 153.  See infra Part.II.C.1. 
 154.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 155.  See infra Part II.A.1.a.  Also consider the increasingly common use of laptops and 
tablets in the public classroom.  See, e.g., James M. Crotty, The Tech-Driven Classroom Is Here, 
but Grades Are Mixed, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmarshall 
crotty/2012/08/21/the-tech-driven-classroom-is-here-but-grades-are-mixed/ (describing 
how education technology already ubiquitous in many classrooms will soon be able to per-
sonalize learning to each individual student); Bryan Goodwin, One-to-One Laptop Programs 
Are No Silver Bullet, 68 TEACHING SCREENAGERS 78, 78–79 (2011), available at 
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational_leadership/feb11/vol68/num05/One-to-
One_Laptop_Programs_Are_No_Silver_Bullet.aspx (assessing the objective success of the 
widespread initiative to adopt one-to-one laptop programs in public classrooms). 
 156.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 157.  See infra Part III. 
 158.  See supra Part I.A. 
 159.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
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rules that appropriately limit their reach.160  The current inability of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to satisfactorily address either con-
cern demonstrates the need for a different approach.161 
1.  Neither the Factually Limited Property Approach nor the Reliance 
on a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Can Keep Pace with 
Modern Technology 
First, it is important to recognize that the property-based ap-
proach offered by Justice Scalia in Jones does not represent a complete 
disregard of the changing nature of electronic information.162  While 
the majority rested its holding on a traditional interpretation of 
Fourth Amendment protections, it specifically emphasized that “we 
do not make trespass the exclusive test.”163  The concurring opinions 
by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito strongly suggest that the Court 
is aware that physical invasions are not prerequisites to violations of 
the Fourth Amendment.164  The Supreme Court has previously recog-
nized as much.165  Secondly, a number of Justices also appear to sup-
port a re-interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to satisfy modern 
needs.166  Nonetheless, any proposed solution must first recognize that 
the modern age has revolutionized the trappings of individual privacy 
and then assess what degree of access police should have to the wealth 
of private information made available by current technology.167 
                                                        
 160.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 161.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 162.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2011) (majority opinion) (“Situations 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain sub-
ject to Katz analysis” (emphasis omitted)). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See supra Part I.C. 
 165.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,’ constitutes a search” (citations omitted)). 
 166.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
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a. The Reach and Intersection of Modern Technology Has 
Fundamentally Transformed the Frame Through Which Society 
Considers Individual Privacy 
As Jones and its contemporaries indicate,168 tracking people’s 
movements using electronic methods has become an increasingly at-
tractive option169 in part due to the low cost and ease with which the 
process is completed.170  Where law enforcement agents previously 
had to expend substantial time, effort, and resources to monitor a 
person’s movements over an extended period of time,171 the success of 
the StarChase Pursuit Management system means that external 
launchers mounted onto patrol cars capable of affixing GPS-equipped 
darts to any vehicle may very well become the new norm rather than a 
science fiction experiment.172 
The reality of modern society reflects a near constant connection 
to some form of information-sharing technology whether the purpose 
is accessing the Internet, replacing a bag of books with a single tablet, 
or simply plugging in to any number of social websites.173  Thus it is 
even easier to initiate the information-gathering process because 
many of the devices that enable these options carry built-in electronic 
                                                        
 168.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 169.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitor-
ing undertaken in this case by enlisting factory—or owner—installed vehicle tracking de-
vices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”). 
 170.  See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“These ‘fantastic 
advances’ continue, and are giving the police access to surveillance techniques that are 
ever cheaper and ever more effective. . . .  Technological progress poses a threat to privacy 
by enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively 
expensive.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“GPS is a vastly differ-
ent and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful technology that is easily and 
cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and remarkably precise tracking capabil-
ity. . . .  Constant, relentless tracking of anything is now not merely possible but entirely 
practicable, indeed much more practicable than the surveillance conducted in Knotts.”). 
 171.  Paul D. Schultz, The Future Is Here: Technology in Police Departments, 75 POLICE CHIEF 
MAG. (June 2008), available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm? 
article_id=1527&fuseaction=display&issue_id=62008 (describing a list of ways in which 
technology has made police investigative work less time-consuming and more effective). 
 172.  See Elaine Pittman, Real-Life Police Technology Catches up with Science Fiction, 
STARCHASE (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.starchase.com/real-life-police-technology-catches-
up-with-science-fiction.html. 
 173.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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GPS trackers that can be activated at a moment’s notice or, more of-
ten, are left on by default.174  The sheer number of smartphones, tab-
lets, and computers owned by the modern citizen further inflates the 
vulnerabilities of a system that continuously transmits potentially pri-
vate information.175  Given this vast and intangible information-
sharing model, a doctrine purporting to protect individual privacy 
rights cannot rest on outdated notions of physical property lest it lack 
relevance and practicality.176 
Despite Justice Alito’s criticism that the majority adopted this ex-
act approach in resting its decision on the physical trespass commit-
ted by the law enforcement agents in Jones, his own reliance on Justice 
Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” raises many of the same 
concerns.177  Particularly in light of ubiquitous gadgets capable of far 
more than just location services, an individual’s “expectation of priva-
cy”178 regarding phone calls and text messages may be even more im-
portant than the privacy of his physical location.179  Moreover, an indi-
vidual assertion of privacy leaves unsettled the second prong of the 
                                                        
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See supra note 4. 
 176.  See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age 2 
(Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-64, 2011) (“[T]oday, with 
the introduction of devices that can see through walls and clothes, monitor public thor-
oughfares twenty-four hours a day, and access millions of records in seconds, police are 
relying much more heavily on what might be called ‘virtual searches,’ investigative tech-
niques that do not require physical access to premises, people, papers or effects . . . . To 
date, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has both failed to an-
ticipate this revolution and continued to ignore it.”).  
 177.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that law enforcement’s 
use of devices enabling them to listen in on conversations made through a public tele-
phone booth to violate the Fourth Amendment), superseded by statute, Wiretap Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2006). 
 178.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 179.  See Renee M. Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 411 (2007) (“Though the necessities of modern life may at times 
require the disclosure of discrete portions of our daily routine to the handful of private 
parties that provide us with services, it is unlikely most Americans would sanction pervasive 
monitoring by our government.”); Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket, DAILY BEAST 
(Feb. 18, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/02/18/the-
snitch-in-your-pocket.html (“[C]ell-phone tracking is among the more unsettling forms of 
government surveillance, conjuring up Orwellian images of Big Brother secretly following 
your movements through the small device in your pocket.”). 
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Katz test, namely, whether “society is prepared to recognize this ex-
pectation of privacy as ‘reasonable.’”180 
Of course, what society expects is not always consistent with the 
expectations of the government.181  Neither is the view of any particu-
lar judge an accurate substitute for the attitude of society.182  In fact, 
society’s expectations of privacy may be unreasonable because of a 
lack of knowledge, a misunderstanding of the underlying technology, 
or pure naivety.183  Justice Harlan’s reasonable suggestion, and by ex-
tension Justice Alito’s, fails to properly fill these holes and leaves as 
many loopholes open in the Fourth Amendment as does Justice Scal-
ia’s trespass theory. 
Importantly, electronic tracking information does not flow di-
rectly to the police in every instance.  Police are increasingly turning 
to Internet service providers and to data storage companies that con-
trol, monitor, and enable the electronic capabilities of any particular 
device.184  While the release of such information is certainly not as 
                                                        
 180.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 181.  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 452 (1927) (“[A] balance should be 
sought between that which will preserve the fundamental safeguard which the Amend-
ment was designed to secure, and at the same time not unduly fetter the arm of the Gov-
ernment in the enforcement of law.”), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438 (1967); see also United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the defendant was merely an “occasional passenger” of a vehicle upon which police 
installed a GPS tracking device and thus “lacked standing to contest the installation and 
use of the GPS device”). 
 182.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“[J]udges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothet-
ical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”); see also Somini Sengupta, Courts Di-
vided Over Searches of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012 
/11/26/technology/legality-of-warrantless-cellphone-searches-goes-to-courts-and-
legislatures.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the various, inconsistent ways that 
judges from different circuits have addressed the same privacy concerns raised by modern 
technology). 
 183.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (noting that while “the Katz test rests on the assumption 
that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy ex-
pectations,” it remains true that “[d]ramatic technological change may lead to periods in 
which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in 
popular attitudes”). 
 184.  See Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms Are Flooded by Requests to Aid Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-
requests-to-aid-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that cellphone carriers 
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simple as asking with a smile, the “third-party doctrine” ensures that 
policing agencies will have access without much more effort.185  This 
doctrine holds that when an individual knowingly entrusts the security 
of private information to a third party, that individual has relin-
quished any expectation of privacy in that information.186  Alternative-
ly, the individual has assumed the risk that his information may be re-
vealed.187  This doctrine has been upheld not only in cases where 
criminals have described their crimes to third parties that have then 
gone to the police,188 but also to situations in which banks have re-
leased the financial records of their clients.189  Applied to cases of 
electronic surveillance, an individual might be said to have relin-
quished any expectation of privacy in his internet activity and even 
the content of calls, text messages, and, of course, location.  As long 
as an individual has knowingly revealed that information through a 
                                                        
responded to “1.3 million demands for subscriber information” in 2011 from “law en-
forcement agencies seeking text messages, caller locations and other information in the 
course of investigations”). 
 185.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by 
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that 
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will 
not be betrayed.”), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
3421 (2006). 
 186.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 
(2009) (“By disclosing to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment 
rights in the information revealed. . . .  In other words, a person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third party.  The Fourth Amendment 
simply does not apply.”). 
 187.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that the defendant did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the number dialed from his telephone be-
cause he “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he di-
aled”). 
 188.  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (“Given the possibility or 
probability that one of his colleagues is cooperating with the police, it is only speculation 
to assert that the defendant’s utterances would be substantially different or his sense of 
security any less if he also thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired for 
sound.”). 
 189.  See Miller, 425 U.S. at, 443 (holding that the defendant did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips filed to two banks be-
cause they were not confidential communications but negotiable instruments voluntarily 
conveyed to banks in the ordinary course of business). 
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run-of-the-mill service contract, for example, the “third-party doc-
trine” ensures that even a single subsequent request will allow police 
access.190 
The resulting hiccup is one unique to our modern context: Ac-
cess to the modern information market necessarily requires one to 
accept the very practical possibility that third-parties will have access 
to this transmitted data.  As Justice Sotomayor suggested, future tech-
nology may very well force the Court to reconsider the very nature of 
privacy and its relationship to the Fourth Amendment.191  As Paul 
Ohm points out, however, that time is now.192  To be socially active 
members of society, modern consumers are left with few alternatives 
but to make public extensive records regarding their whereabouts, in-
terests, and possessions, lest they choose to opt out from integration 
altogether.193  Upholding the third-party doctrine as it currently exists 
would ignore the needs of the deeply connected state in which we 
                                                        
 190.  For an opposing perspective, see Kerr, supra note 186, at 565 (arguing that under-
standing the third-party doctrine as a “subset of consent law rather than an application of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test” allows it to “fit[] naturally within the rest of 
Fourth Amendment law”). 
 191.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third par-
ties.  This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.” (citations omitted)). 
 192.  See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1310 (“If we woke up tomorrow in a world without pri-
vacy, we might also find ourselves in a world without constitutional protection from new, 
invasive police powers.  This bleak scenario is not science fiction, for tomorrow we will like-
ly wake up in that world.”). 
 193.  See Hutchins, supra note 179, at 411 (“Though the necessities of modern life may 
at times require the disclosure of discrete portions of our daily routine to the handful of 
private parties that provide us with services, it is unlikely most Americans would sanction 
pervasive monitoring by our government.”); see also Ohm, supra note 69, at 1314–16 (de-
scribing how the concurrence of the “one device,” a high-powered machine like an iPhone 
that continually sends a person’s information to an online provider; the “cloud,” distant 
servers that store millions of private messages and work product; “the social,” social net-
works that encourage people to reveal their thoughts and behaviors; and “Big Data,” com-
panies that analyze all this information to infer private details about a person’s life have 
created a new “surveillance society” in which privacy has effectively disintegrated). 
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now reside.194  In a “world without privacy,” the Fourth Amendment 
must adopt a similarly fresh perspective or else it will leave vulnerable 
those it seeks to protect.195 
b.  The Array of Information Gathered by Third-Party Technology 
Rewards in Medias Res196 Investigation and Enables Armchair 
Policing 
Given the vulnerabilities already afforded by the current state of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is particularly disconcerting that 
it also rewards police who take advantage of its loopholes.  In many 
cases, information gathered through electronic sources already exists 
in one form or another and often in the hands of more than one enti-
ty.197  Thus even when a law enforcement agency must first obtain a 
warrant or request certain information from an internet service pro-
vider, subsequent access to the wealth of available information regard-
ing any particular target is nearly immediate.198  This not only allows 
law enforcement agents to reap the fruits of third-party efforts, but al-
so rewards their behavior in the expenses, resources, and time saved 
by doing so.199 
The extent of information that can be gleaned from this process 
supports a new approach to policing that this Comment will refer to 
as “armchair policing.”  This concept is best described in the context 
of the “mosaic theory,” the approach emphasized by the lower court 
                                                        
 194.  See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1331 (arguing that “getting rid of the third-party doc-
trine is necessary but not nearly sufficient to ensure the appropriate protection of the 
Fourth Amendment”). 
 195.  Id. at 1311 (“If we continue to interpret the Fourth Amendment as we always have, 
we will find ourselves not only in a surveillance society, but also in a surveillance state.”). 
 196.  See in medias res, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/in%20medias%20res (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (defining the phrase “in media res” as 
“in or into the middle of a narrative or plot”). 
 197.  See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 198.  People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009) (“One need only con-
sider what the police may learn, practically effortlessly, from planting a single [GPS] de-
vice.  The whole of a person’s progress through the world, into both public and private 
spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods possibly limited only by 
the need to change the transmitting unit’s batteries.”). 
 199.  See Lichtblau, supra note 184 (describing reports that “law enforcement officials 
are shifting away from wiretaps in favor of other forms of cell tracking that are generally 
less legally burdensome, less time consuming and less costly”). 
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in Maynard.200  The “mosaic theory” emphasized that “[p]rolonged 
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term 
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not, 
and what he does ensemble.”  Moreover, “[t]hese types of infor-
mation can each reveal more about a person than does any individual 
trip viewed in isolation.”201  Most importantly, however, “‘[w]hat may 
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one 
who has a broad view of the scene.’”202  Alternatively put, the “pro-
longed surveillance of a person’s movements may reveal an intimate 
picture of his life . . . occasion[s] a heretofore unknown type of intru-
sion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”203 
As the “third-party doctrine” grants police the ability to begin an 
investigation in medias res, law enforcement officers are thus afforded 
the capacity to sit back, relax, and sift through large quantities of in-
formation from the comfort and the safety of their own offices, simul-
taneously avoiding many substantive legal barriers.  In terms of the 
expenses saved by substituting actual fieldwork for a leisurely data-
mining process alone, it is no stretch to suggest that “armchair polic-
ing” is a highly attractive option and a more effective one as well. 
This new ability greatly upsets the balance of effort and reward.  
Traditionally, the expense of gathering information against a particu-
lar target was an important factor in whether a law enforcement 
agency might proceed against a particular target.204  The nature of an 
ongoing investigation also provides some degree of extended supervi-
sion supplied either internally or by a judge, another protection re-
scinded in this abbreviated process.205  By removing the balancing of 
                                                        
 200.  United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011). 
 201.  Id. at 562. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. at 562–65.  The court also noted that “when it comes to the Fourth Amend-
ment, means do matter.”  Id. at 566. 
 204.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (“Traditional surveillance for any extended period of 
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.  The surveillance at issue in 
this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have 
required a large team . . . . Only an investigation of unusual importance could have justi-
fied such an expenditure of law enforcement resources.  Devices like the one used in the 
present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”). 
 205.  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (declaring that the primary rea-
son behind the warrant procedure is to “interpose a neutral and detached magistrate be-
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risk and reward introduced by the warrant process, “armchair polic-
ing” thus inappropriately inflates the information-gathering ability of 
law enforcement relative to the vulnerable individual. 
2.  The Legitimate Interest in Effective Policing Mechanisms Benefits 
from Unclear Boundaries and Suffers from Arbitrary Judicial 
Whims 
Interest in individual privacy aside, it would be a substantive 
omission not to acknowledge a factor just as weighty: the interest in 
an effective and unburdened police force.206  While it has been posit-
ed previously that the inherent nature of the Fourth Amendment in-
troduces inefficiency into the policing system, it has also been empha-
sized that extending its protection too far will unnecessarily impede 
policing efforts.207  This fundamental struggle between enabling po-
lice with the best possible tools to facilitate law enforcement versus 
the concern for individual privacy is a significant factor in driving the 
judiciary’s inconsistent applications of the Fourth Amendment.208 
The interest in making accessible to officers and to federal agents 
the most effective, useful, and up-to-date technology is a cornerstone 
of an effective law enforcement system.  Better tools not only facilitate 
discovery and prosecution of crime but also help law enforcement stay 
competitive relative to criminals all too willing to exploit the best 
technology available.  Thus, to unnecessarily restrict police access to 
outdated means and mechanisms already abandoned by their opposi-
tion places them at a severe disadvantage.209  Professor Orin Kerr de-
scribed this balancing act by the courts as an “equilibrium-based” ap-
proach in which the Fourth Amendment is inconsistently interpreted 
                                                        
tween the citizen and the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 206.  See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 207.  See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Of course the 
[Fourth] [A]mendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more effi-
cient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.  There is a tradeoff be-
tween security and privacy, and often it favors security.” (citations omitted)). 
 208.  See supra Part I.B. 
 209.  See Ulf Wolf, Cyber-Crime: Law Enforcement Must Keep Pace with Tech-Savvy Criminals, 
DIGITALCOMMUNITIES (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Cyber 
-Crime-Law-Enforcement-Must-Keep-Pace.html (“The important point is that cyber-
criminals aren’t sitting still; they’re probably increasing the distance between themselves 
and the law—beyond the yonder mountain range already.  Law enforcement has no op-
tion but to catch up.”). 
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to maintain a somewhat equal playing field between law enforcement 
and would-be criminals.210  Yet this theory suffers from an underlying 
problem: Law enforcement officers often discover the limits to their 
power only after violating those boundaries.  The equilibrium-based 
approach is a rigged game: One side has no clue what the rules are 
while the other has no rules at all. 
Compare the way in which state and federal courts have inter-
preted the Fourth Amendment differently despite factually similar 
circumstances.211  In Garcia, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit held 
that no warrant was required before police attached a GPS-enabled 
tracking device to someone’s vehicle because “GPS tracking is on the 
same side of the divide with the surveillance cameras and satellite im-
aging.”212  Likewise in Marquez, attaching a GPS-enabled tracking de-
vice to someone’s bumper violates no “legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.”213  Yet the Washington Supreme Court said any installation of 
GPS devices onto a person’s vehicle necessitated a warrant because of 
the dangers of prolonged electronic surveillance,214 and the Supreme 
Court of New York did the same while also emphasizing that GPS 
technology is “vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated” 
than a “mere enhancement of human sensory capability.”215  In all 
                                                        
 210.  Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476 (2011).  Paul Ohm took Professor Kerr’s analysis one step further and suggested 
that statistical metrics be used to assess the proper balance between police powers and in-
dividual privacy.  See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1313 (“The problems with Kerr’s theory are its 
informality and indeterminacy. . . .  To lend rigor to this approach, I recommend that 
judges look for hard, objective measures of how much the playing field has tilted-statistical 
quantities like length of investigation and number of indictments.  When criminals use 
new private services and technologies in ways that, for example, increase the average 
length of police investigations, judges should relax Fourth Amendment burdens on the 
police.  Conversely, when the police use tools to decrease the average length of investiga-
tions, judges should tighten these burdens.”). 
 211.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 212.  United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 213.  United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 214.  State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
 215.  People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009); see also United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part, United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945 (2011) (finding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality 
of his movements over the course of a month even though law enforcement could consti-
tutionally conduct warrantless observations of his individual movements from one place to 
another while in public). 
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four occasions, police acted in public places with similar intents and 
results, but the opinions split down two opposite paths. 
This inconsistent and, at times, discretionary application of the 
Fourth Amendment creates a significant and unintended effect: the 
lack of a bright-line rule delineating what police may or may not do 
fundamentally frustrates their efforts.  Specifically, if law enforcement 
agencies have no clear guidelines, it should come as no surprise when 
they overstep the bounds of their authority.  Consequently, police 
may be baffled at the very outset of their investigations.216  Even await-
ing a final dictation by the Court leaves citizens and police engaged 
inside a temporary minefield with no clear exits.  Therefore, the cur-
rent state of the Fourth Amendment frustrates the efforts of law en-
forcement just as much as it leaves the individual vulnerable to the 
vast, accessible nature of modern technology. 
B.  Legislatures Are Better Qualified to Weigh the Concerns of All Parties 
Impacted by the Uncertain Scheme of Privacy Rights 
The solution to this pitched disparity between the privacy rights 
afforded to the individual versus the capacity of the police to conduct 
thorough investigations has so far been relegated to the judiciary.  
The inconsistent application of the Fourth Amendment to an admit-
tedly complicated series of situations, however, has left citizens and 
law enforcement agencies confused and frustrated.217  Rather than a 
lack of effort or consideration, the judiciary may simply lack the insti-
tutional competence to weigh the issue properly.218 
Whereas the judiciary offers a limited arena in which only a few 
voices can be entertained at a time, and even then only within a spe-
cific context, the legislative process offers a far larger and more acces-
sible stage upon which to reconcile the interests of multiple parties.  
Not only would the voices of the government be articulated in an 
open setting, but private advocates would also be afforded a more im-
pactful opportunity to contribute to the conversation.  Additionally, 
                                                        
 216.  See Cameron Steele, New Digital Equipment Can Help Police, but Agencies Need to be 
Wary, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12 
/13/3722752/as-police-expand-surveillance.html (highlighting city officials’ concerns that 
“police have to be meticulous and transparent in developing guidelines for using these 
surveillance systems if they want residents to see them as protectors, rather than invaders 
of privacy”). 
 217.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 218.  See Slobogin, supra note 176 at 19 (“Comparing the effectiveness, not to mention 
the expense, of these competing approaches is far from the typical judicial job.”). 
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the participation of officials that represent the will of certain constitu-
encies offers the average citizen an avenue to affect legislative pro-
ceedings.219 
Even more significantly, a discussion at this larger stage grants 
one more benefit not available to the judiciary: the chance for the 
technology industry as a whole to offer its input on the nature, design, 
and future evolution of electronic monitoring technology.  Major 
technology companies and Internet service providers, such as Google 
and Verizon, have often found themselves in the middle between us-
ers and government agencies seeking to access their data.220  While 
many have resisted revealing their customer information, the judiciary 
has been exposed to their concerns one expert witness at a time.  In 
contrast, a legislative setting would furnish these gatekeepers of elec-
tronic privacy with the opportunity to affect directly the laws govern-
ing their industry.221 
The submission of this issue to a collaborative, legislative body 
would not be a case of first impression.  In Title III of the Wiretap 
                                                        
 219.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806  (2004) (arguing that “the legislative 
branch rather than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when tech-
nology is changing” because “[t]echnological change may reveal the institutional limits of 
the modern enterprise of constitutional criminal procedure, exposing the need for statu-
tory guidance”).  Kerr also suggests that the “deferential stance” of the Court is a message 
that “we should not expect the Fourth Amendment alone to provide adequate protections 
against invasions of privacy made possible by law enforcement use of new technologies.”  
Id. at 838.  Rather, “Congress will likely remain the primary source of privacy protections 
in new technologies thanks to institutional advantages of legislatures.”  Id. 
 220.  See David Teather, Google Defies White House over Disclosing Users’ Searches, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2006/jan/21/security.usnews 
(reporting that Google defied a request by the U.S. government to turn over roughly one 
million randomly selected web addresses to scour the users’ search data); Ellen 
Nakashima, Verizon Says It Turned over Data Without Court Orders, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2007, 
at A1 (relaying Verizon Communications’ admission that it provided customers’ telephone 
records to federal authorities in emergency cases without court orders several hundred 
times since 2006). 
 221.  See Nick Feamster, The Internet’s Gatekeepers, ALLTHINGSD (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://allthingsd.com/20110211/the-internets-gatekeepers/ (comparing the censorship 
prominent in countries like Egypt and China to the United States to weigh two competing 
concerns: “Should free and open communication . . . be considered an unalienable right?  
How much control should a government or Internet service provider wield over its citi-
zens’ communications?”).  
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Act,222 Congress sought to regulate the collection of the content of 
wire and electronic communications.223  With an exception for wire 
and electronic communication services providing the wiretap, the Act 
effectively barred the government from intercepting all communica-
tions except those that are publicly accessible.224  Similarly, in the 
ECPA225 the legislature sought to extend restrictions placed on the 
government’s ability to intercept traditional telephone calls onto at-
tempts made to monitor electronic transmissions of data by comput-
er.226  The legislature later extended the ECPA’s scope to prohibit un-
fettered access to stored electronic data through the Stored 
Communications Act.227 
In both instances, Congress recognized the difficulties faced by 
the judiciary in enacting two broad, uniform solutions to concerns 
shared on a large scale.228  The broad definitions of wiretaps and elec-
tronic communications demonstrate that Congress was well aware of 
the substantial risk that inaction would facilitate the use of private 
communications in violation of the Fourth Amendment.229  It also re-
flects a fluency with the underlying technology that individual judges 
limited by time and scope are unlikely to share.  A similar undertak-
ing to resolve the quagmire currently frustrating the Fourth Amend-
ment’s application to modern technological capabilities would likely 
benefit far more from the experience of a proven collaborator than 
the opinion of any individual judge.230 
                                                        
 222.  Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006)). 
 223.  42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006). 
 224.  Id.  The definition of an “electronic communication” specifically excluded “any 
communication from a tracking device.”  Id. 
 225.  Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2006)). 
 226.  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).  The ECPA also excluded from its protection communi-
cations gathered via tracking devices.  Id. 
 227.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
 228.  See Kerr, supra note 219, at 849–50 (tracing the history leading up the enactment 
of Title III, specifically, that Congress was already prepared to enact new wiretap laws to 
resolve a deep split in the courts and refrained from doing so because the Court was to 
hear arguments in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
954 (1967), which it “decided both . . . very much with Congress in mind”). 
 229.  42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006). 
 230.  See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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Just as the judiciary is constantly burdened with a limited 
timeframe to deal with a seemingly endless stream of cases, so too are 
legislatures inundated by their own weighty dockets.  The recent grid-
lock in Congress demonstrates that even if the legislative level is infi-
nitely better equipped to assess the Fourth Amendment as it applies 
to emerging technology, the judiciary does not have the luxury of 
waiting for an external solution. 
C.  In the Absence of Reasoned Legislative Action, Courts Must Recognize 
GPS-Enabled Tracking Falls Within the Fourth Amendment’s 
Protection Against Unreasonable Government Interference 
Absent legislative action, the judiciary must undertake a substan-
tial shift in its perspective to appropriately address the privacy con-
cerns that Jones raises.  The first step is to recognize uniformly the use 
of GPS-enabled tracking devices and other electronic monitoring 
gadgets as searches under the Fourth Amendment in their initial in-
stallation and subsequent use by police agencies.  Any warrantless use 
of these devices must be considered in violation of that constitutional 
protection.231  Secondly, judges would be better served by framing this 
protection as a “right to exclude” the government rather than a “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”232 
1. Courts Ought to Recognize the Weaknesses of the Fourth 
Amendment by Requiring Warrants Before Conducting Electronic 
Surveillance 
First, it is immediately necessary to classify the use of GPS-
enabled devices and other electronic monitoring methods as searches 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Whether this view is justified on the 
grounds that in such circumstances the government is seeking infor-
mation233 or simply that people have a right “to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,”234 a person ought to be afforded 
some degree of privacy in how he chooses to use a smartphone, com-
puter, or vehicle.  Without a proper judicially authorized warrant, at-
taching a device to any of these items to monitor the activities of their 
                                                        
 231.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 232.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 233.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2011) (majority opinion) (“It is im-
portant to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied 
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”). 
 234.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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owner ought to be understood as intruding on a right to use them 
without undue interference.  Similarly, the use of such devices to 
monitor, track, and transfer private information to police agencies, 
with or without a physical installation, must also be construed as an 
inappropriate exercise of power. 
Warrants necessarily inject the judiciary into the investigative 
process.235  The requirement is designed, not as a burden or speed-
bump to police efforts, but rather to introduce the judgment of a 
“neutral, detached magistrate” into what is typically a subjective pro-
cess initiated by officers invested in a particular outcome.236  General-
ly, this helps to legitimize and to direct the scope of most investiga-
tions.  Yet, in regards to satisfying the protection afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment, it is also to the overall benefit of society that the 
decision of a reasoned individual removed from the immediate con-
flict is placed between powerful electronic devices and the law en-
forcement agents seeking to obtain that information.237  Requiring 
warrants in the investigative process thus injects a necessary dose of 
honesty—not just to prevent potential police abuse, but to add an ex-
tra layer of protection and oversight in favor of the individual. 
For example, in Garcia, Judge Posner seemed convinced that GPS 
technology was so similar to surveillance cameras and satellite imag-
ing such that if the latter two did not raise Fourth Amendment con-
cerns, neither should the former.238  The Marquez court emphasized 
that public streets were not suitable for any reasonable expectation of 
privacy.239  Regardless of whether citizens have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in their travels in public, warrants provide the neces-
sary level of legitimacy to justify police access to these exact applica-
tions of modern technology.  Seizing tapes of surveillance cameras 
routinely requires a warrant, and while the use of public roads is cer-
tainly within the public eye, the Supreme Court has agreed that pro-
                                                        
 235.  See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (“Inher-
ent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a ‘neutral and detached magistrate.’”). 
 236.  Id. (holding that “where practical, a governmental search and seizure should rep-
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longed surveillance implicates Fourth Amendment protection.240  
Notwithstanding the lack of a bright-line rule or reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy,241 police can avoid these issues by obtaining the seal of 
approval a warrant provides.  Accordingly, warrantless police surveil-
lance such as that in Jones must be treated as a violation of the Consti-
tution. 
2. Framing Fourth Amendment Protection as an Active Right to 
Exclude Versus a Passive Right to Privacy Offers a Stronger, More 
Uniform Source of Law 
Even in cases where a warrant is obtained prior to the use of elec-
tronic surveillance, courts still entertain challenges to the use of evi-
dence gathered using modern devices.  Although warrants, by defini-
tion, introduce more checks into the legal process, the existing 
doctrine is unclear about when a warrant is needed and under what 
terms.  To address this uncertainty and to better frame the tension 
created in the Fourth Amendment by new technologies, the judiciary 
should respond to Jones by re-framing the Fourth Amendment’s “right 
to be secure”242 into a “right to exclude” the government. 
Since Katz, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as pro-
tecting a right of privacy, specifically, the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”243  
Considering privacy as the underlying motivation of the Fourth 
Amendment, however, narrows the larger issue of individual privacy 
into a struggle between the individual and the government.  This ap-
proach has since fallen short of providing reliable protection.244  Fur-
thermore, stretching Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into an era 
exposed to rapid developments in information-sharing technology is a 
lost cause.245 
That said, Justice Scalia’s approach in Jones is valid because physi-
cal trespass was traditionally a staple of many government investiga-
                                                        
 240.  See supra text accompanying notes 132–135. 
 241.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
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tions.246  Justice Scalia also agreed with Justices Sotomayor and Alito 
insofar as he upheld the Katz test absent physical trespass.247  What 
their opinions collectively demonstrate, however, is that stretching the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, rooted in an age without the Internet 
or the smartphone, to one in which information is constantly passed 
through a vast, intangible stream of data is a stopgap measure at best, 
and a wasted effort at worst.248  Moreover, the current interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment is a primarily reactive one, offering protec-
tion only after it already has been violated.  Given a system where po-
lice regularly can reap the benefits of third parties already inundated 
with a person’s private information merely by requesting pre-
assembled records,249 a reactive right fails to afford any real protection 
in a world where sensitive information is already available.  The focus, 
instead, must be on preventing any access. 
As the Katz court famously held, “the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places.”250  Simultaneously, the Fourth Amendment 
text secures “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”251  Nowhere 
in the amendment is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” men-
tioned, and only where there is a “warrant issued upon probable 
cause”252 may this protection be violated.  That the warrant process is 
described as an initial protection implies that the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee is not a reactive right, but a positive one to be held at the 
forefront of any intrusion contemplated by the government.  An indi-
vidual’s right to “secure” his items253 is an additional sign that courts 
ought to employ a process in which the Fourth Amendment acts as 
the first line of defense to unreasonable searches before they may be 
carried out.  Viewing this protection as a “right to exclude” properly 
encapsulates a positive guarantee flexible enough to adapt to a society 
increasingly exposed by pervasive information-sharing technology.254 
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 247.  See supra text accompanying notes 133–135. 
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Alternatively, the right to secure one’s effects against unreasona-
ble intrusion can be analogized to a right to exclude the government 
from unreasonably intruding on those same objects.255  In the course 
of consistently respecting the right of an individual to be secure in 
one’s home, for example, courts have guaranteed the freedom to do 
what one wishes inside that home.256  As with a right to security, this 
freedom cannot be fully respected without simultaneously affording 
the ability to control access and, at times, to deny it.257  This scope of 
protection ought to be no different simply because a person’s papers 
and effects exist within an electronic network rather than a physical 
folder cabinet. 
While this approach is by no means a complete solution, it offers 
a more consistent and more flexible guideline for individual courts to 
make informed decisions in limited timeframes.  Given the annual 
software and hardware updates available for most smartphones on the 
market, there is little doubt that new methods of gathering and stor-
ing information will eventually replace GPS-enabled devices and fur-
ther blur the line at issue in Jones.  A “right to exclude” is designed to 
avoid becoming as outdated as a “reasonable expectation of privacy”258 
because it is not as subjective nor is it tethered to any physical limits.  
Thus, while imperfect, the “right to exclude” presents a doctrine 
more stable and more flexible than the outdated reasoning applied in 
Jones. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
United States v. Jones reaches far beyond the sum of its parts and 
implicates a much larger concern—the degree of individual privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  While no Justice disputed the 
outcome of Jones, Justices Sotomayor and Alito disapproved of Justice 
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Scalia’s emphasis on property rights259 for good reason: substantial 
quantities of information no longer exist as physical documents, but 
rather as intangible electronic data.260  Moreover, the increasing 
ubiquity of smart devices designed to share information efficiently has 
expanded exponentially the vast cloud of potentially private infor-
mation available to “armchair police” courtesy of the “third-party doc-
trine.”261  Jones avoided confronting either of these issues despite 
vague warnings of a new technological age,262 electing instead to con-
done the inconsistencies of the lower courts263 and to further weaken 
a Fourth Amendment already at risk of irrelevancy.264  Although legis-
latures may ultimately be better suited to reconcile these concerns,265 
courts must step forward as the first line of defense to a constitutional 
guarantee by accepting two core principles: (1) utilizing GPS-enabled 
devices without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment,266 and (2) a 
positive “right to exclude” presents a more flexible and more con-
sistent source of protection than a reactive expectation of privacy.267 
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